February 2, 2014

THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE DRAMA OF ENRON

Why Enron Failed

BACKGROUND
Enron started humbly enough in 1985 from the merger of two natural gas pipeline companies. The rise of Enron over the next 15 years was meteoric. As a result of pipeline deregulation, Enron emerged as an energy trader – matching buyers and sellers while making huge profits as a broker. Enron also expanded into other business areas, including water, fiber optics, newsprint, and telecommunications. Annual revenues rose from about $9 billion in 1995 to over $100 billion in 2000. Enron was listed as the 6th largest company in the world, by revenues, in 2001. Enron was a major political contributor, with nearly $6 million in campaign contributions since 1990. President George W. Bush referred to Enron CEO ken lay as “Kenny Boy.” Enron frequently appeared on lists of the “best companies to work for” and “most innovative companies.”

PROBLEM
The Enron bubble burst over a period of a few months in late 2001. Enron’s stock price had already been sliding for months, from $80 per share in February to around $30 in early October. Enron had been using its stock value as collateral to obtain loans from complicated “partnerships.” These partnerships allowed Enron, using questionable accounting techniques, to exclude this debt from its annual reports and thus inflate its apparent profits. On October 16, 2001, Enron third-quarter report indicated a $638 million loss along with an unexplained reduction in shareholder equity of $1.2 billion related to these partnerships.
After this announcement, things unraveled quickly. The Securities and Exchange Commission announced an investigation the next week. By early November, Enron’s stock price had fallen to less than $10 per share, forcing it to borrow billions of dollars in an attempt to save the company. Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Anderson, was accused of shredding documents and complicity in the deception. Enron’s stock was downgraded to “junk” status and hit $0.70 per share on Nov. 28. On December 2, Enron filed for bankruptcy.
Investors lost about $60 billion in the Enron collapse. Among the hardest hit were Enron employees who had most of their 401(k) retirement value in Enron stock. Many of these employees saw their retirement savings completely depleted. By early 2004, 14 former Enron executives had been indicted under a federal investigation (seven had pleaded guilty).

THEORY
Prescriptive Approaches to Ethics at Enron
Enron was a global energy firm that filed for bankruptcy protection in 2001. The firm’s senior managers had engaged in fraud for an extended period through a scheme in which partnerships owned by the managers could receive payment for goods and services never provided to Enron. In addition, the firm’s external auditing firm, Arthur Andersen, was complicit in the fraud by knowingly certifying false financial statements as accurate. Arthur Anderson participated in the fraud because the firm did not want to risk losing lucrative consulting contracts from Enron, which created a conflict of interest situation (Miller, 2004). The events leading to the collapse of Enron can be analyzed using the ethical frameworks suggested by consequentialist theory, deontological theory, and virtue ethics. Such an analysis can provide an explanation of the failure of Enron’s directors, mangers, and auditors to adhere to their ethical duties to the shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers of the firm. Consequentialist theory suggests that an act is ethically wrong if it results in consequences deemed wrong or harmful by the majority of people in a society (Hooker, 2002). The consequentialist theory requires assessing the actual consequences of the act, which includes both direct and indirect consequences. It also requires using some type of evaluative norm for determining whether the consequence is beneficial or harmful. The theory is prescriptive because the evaluative norms are used to guide whether individuals should perform or avoid an act. To apply the theory, there must be general agreement in a society as to the nature of the evaluative norms. The theory also suggests that the ethics of each situation should be determined according to the specific circumstances without reference to an absolute legalistic or moralistic standard.

CONCLUSION
Enron’s collapse was devastating in many regards. Thousands of people lost their retirement savings, and the energy industry was greatly affected. But perhaps the greatest damage was to people’s trust in businesses and their leaders. The study of Enron shows that a company’s leaders are not always positive influencers who lead the company to do the best good for its stakeholders. The collapse of Enron highlights the importance of analyzing an organization’s behaviors to detect potential unethical acts. The actions of the company executives, the culture established, the employee motivations employed, and the company structure can all provide signals regarding whether a company is ethically sound.



January 22, 2014

MEXICAN TRUCKS AND AMERICAN SAFETY











BACKGROUND:

The suspension of the cross-border pilot trucking program by Congress in 2009 has been a breach of our international commitments, an embarrassment to our nation, and a barrier to two-way U.S. trade with the people of Mexico. The time is long overdue to correct this injustice and economic distortion by fully implementing the trucking provisions of NAFTA.

Under the 1994 agreement, the United States and Mexico were to allow trucks from each country to deliver goods to destinations inside the other country, provided the trucks and their drivers met all safety regulations mandated by the host government. According to Annex I of the agreement, licensed and qualified Mexican trucks were to be allowed to make deliveries in U.S. border states by 1995, a year after the agreement went into effect, and throughout the U.S. by 2000. U.S. truck firms were to be granted the same access to Mexico. But under pressure from the Teamsters union, President Clinton unilaterally suspended implementation of the provisions in 1995, citing safety concerns.
CASE  PROBLEM:

The failure of Congress to allow implementation of the NAFTA trucking provisions has proven costly to the United States in three important ways.

First, U.S. failure to comply has deprived our economy of the efficiencies of moving goods across our mutual border at lower cost. With the ban in place, trucks approaching the border are required to unload their cargo into warehouses in so-called commercial zones within 25 miles of the border, only to have that cargo reloaded onto short-haul vehicles and then onto domestic trucks for final delivery. This inefficient system causes delays, increased pollution and added costs at busy border crossings such as Calexico East; San Ysidro; Nogales, Ariz.; and Laredo, Texas. Because more than 70 percent of U.S. trade with Mexico travels by truck, the ban on cross-border trucking imposes an additional $200 million to $400 million in transportation costs each year, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.

Second, failure to comply has exposed U.S. exporters to perfectly legal sanctions imposed by the Mexican government. Under the provisions of NAFTA, and after waiting patiently for more than a decade, the Mexican government imposed sanctions in 2009 on more than $2.4 billion in U.S. exports affect 100 products, from Washington apples to Iowa pork. The sanctions would be lifted in two stages as the U.S. government implements the proposed program to comply with Annex I.

Third, failure to comply has compromised the U.S. government’s reputation as a good citizen of the global trading system. Simply put, the U.S. government has failed to keep its word to our Mexican neighbors. Our government has been in flagrant violation of a major trade agreement for more than 15 years. This breach of trust has undermined the U.S. government’s standing to challenge other governments, from Mexico to China to the European Union, who may also be in violation of various trade agreements. The Obama administration’s promise to more vigorously “enforce” our rights in the World Trade Organization and other agreements will lack credibility as long as the U.S. government fails to comply with such clear commitments as the trucking provisions of NAFTA.










THEORIES:

President George W. Bush, to his credit, tried to fulfill the U.S. obligation under NAFTA. His administration launched a pilot program in 2007, which allowed a limited number of Mexican trucking companies to deliver goods to U.S. destinations beyond the 25-mile commercial zone along the U.S.-Mexican border. Citing unsubstantiated safety concerns, and in the face of ongoing union pressure, a bipartisan majority in Congress voted to cut off funding for the program in 2009.

The Obama administration has sought to reinstate the program under the “concept document” released in January 2011. The document and the attending regulations would go a significant way toward implementing the original NAFTA obligations and should be adopted as soon as possible.
Suspension of the pilot program in 2009 was based on protectionism and prejudice, not legitimate safety concerns. Although Teamsters union leaders talk about safety, their real agenda is not to promote safer roads but to protect themselves from increased competition. The broader agenda of their congressional allies is to thwart full implementation of a successful trade agreement with Mexico, our third-largest trading partner. The real objection they have to Mexican trucks making deliveries to U.S. cities is not that they are unsafe but that those trucks are driven by Mexicans. In the eyes of too many members of Congress, “driving while Mexican” remains an unacceptable public hazard.

In contrast to those stereotypes, experience from the pilot program has demonstrated that Mexican trucks and their drivers are fully capable of complying with all U.S. safety requirements. An August 2009 report from the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General found that only 1.2 percent of Mexican drivers that were inspected were placed out of service for violations, compared to nearly 7 percent of U.S. drivers who were inspected. The “out of service” rate for Mexican trucks was slightly lower than the rate for U.S. trucks, even though Mexican trucks were inspected six times more often than the U.S. trucks.

CONCLUSION:

Whether or not the United States should fulfill its NAFTA commitment and allow Mexican cargo trucks to travel throughout the United States is a controversial issue. On one hand, free traders have favored an open transportation policy on the grounds that it will lead to greater economic efficiency and benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices. They also note that the world opinion of the United States has deteriorated as the U.S. has maintained its refusal to grant access to Mexican cargo trucks. However, the Teamsters and other unions have officially opposed an open transportation policy on the grounds of truck safety, although job preservation for their members appears to be an important part of their motivation.

Indeed, strong political forces have served as a barrier to an open trucking policy. During his campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama maintained that an open transportation policy should not be applied to Mexican drivers and that the United States should renegotiate NAFTA. Since Obama became president, he has slowly moved in the direction of granting access to Mexican truckers, as seen in his March, 2011 announcement of a trucking deal with Mexico. Nevertheless, a skeptical Congress has dragged its feet on forming free trade and transportation deals not only with Mexico, but with other countries such as South Korea and Colombia. At the writing of this paper, it remains to be seen if President Obama can convince Congress to ratify his trucking deal with Mexico.

What will be the effects for commercial trucking under the Obama-Calderon deal? It is likely that the opening of the Mexico-U.S. border will be based on gradualism, and therefore the effects will be modest. That is, there will not be an immediate surge of U.S. long-haul trucks into Mexico during the first several years after enactment, nor a surge of Mexican long-haul trucks into the United States. Why is this so?
Mexican cargo trucks operating in the United States will continue to encounter several disadvantages. Increased border delays since the September 11 terrorist attack against the United States have added to the time that Mexican trucks and drivers are not operating, resulting in increased costs that burden long-haul cargo companies and discourage them from making commitments to trade with the United States. Moreover, Mexican trucks will be handicapped by relatively high costs of insurance, an English language requirement that restricts the number of Mexican trucks that can operate legally in the United States, and relatively higher interest rates due to less access to financial resources than their American competitors.

Another disadvantage to Mexican trucking companies operating in the United States is that the profitability of trucking declines with an increase in the distance that empty trailers are hauled. For a Mexican trucking company, lower wages of Mexican drivers increase its competitiveness. However, this advantage can be significantly offset by the lack of a revenue-earning backhaul, since it is illegal for a Mexican truck to pick up and make a domestic U.S. delivery on the way back to Mexico. Therefore, it is likely that only the U.S.-Mexico border states will initially serve as the major zone of competition; that is, only a few Mexican trucking firms that develop business relationships with American customers will be able to benefit from backhaul loads from deep in the United States to Mexico.

The likelihood of substantial numbers of U.S. trucking companies’ immediately providing cargo service deep into Mexico also appears to be low. Once an American truck and driver enter Mexico, they encounter a labor cost disadvantage relative to their Mexican competitors. Also, many U.S. drivers do not speak fluent Spanish, and they may also believe that Mexico is becoming an increasingly dangerous place to operate, in view of the violence of Mexican drug cartels. These factors will continue to discourage long-haul U.S. cargo truckers from traveling very far into Mexico. Most of the access will likely be near the border, where Mexican trucking firms will face increasing competition from American companies serving the industrial parks’ (maquiladora) trade.

Over the longer run, the ability of Mexican truck companies to extend their range into the United States, or U.S. trucking companies to penetrate Mexico, will become less dependent on government rules applied to commercial activities and more dependent on the economics of global trucking. The major determinant of the growth of border truck crossings has been the growth in trade between the two countries, which determines the amount of freight that must be transported across the border. It is unlikely that the Obama-Calderon plan to open transportation networks will, by itself, result in a substantial increase in the amount of cargo transported across the border.

The economic relationship with Mexico is strategic to the United States because of the implications it has for bilateral trade, economic conditions in both countries, economic competitiveness, and border security. President Calderon and President Obama have reaffirmed their shared values and the need for increased cooperation in North America to promote economic growth and competitiveness. If the United States is to deepen economic integration with Mexico, it is necessary that the long-standing trucking dispute between these countries be put to an end.



REFERENCE





November 19, 2013

BLACK GOLD






Firstly, Black Gold follows Tadesse’s attempts to develop business with coffee companies willing to work outside the New York market. In Trieste, London and Seattle, he is successful and is soon able to start paying his farmers a small profit which they put towards building a school. During the story, the reader discovers many interesting facts about coffee and the lives of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers. It ends on a hopeful note and a reminder to all coffee drinkers to "think before you drink".

Secondly, Tadesse Meskela, head of Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Union, an Ethiopian Co-operative which is trying to get a fair price for the coffee produced by its members. This is a recent problem. Before the early 1990s, the International Coffee Organization made sure that farmers received a fair price for their coffee. But after the US left the ICO in 1993, coffee prices were set by the New York Board of Trade. They went too low, with the result that large coffee companies got rich while many coffee farmers in developing countries grew poor. The World Trade Organization talks in Mexico in 2003 were supposed to help solve this problem but ended in failure. After this, Tadesse’s realized that the only way to help his farmers was through the Fair Trade Movement. They would sell coffee to companies willing to pay a fair price which would then allow them to use the Fair Trade logo on their products.


Finally,  Follow the journey of Tadesse Meskela around the world in search of buyers for and a better price for the coffee of the farmer working for the coffee producers’ cooperative. I witness the breakdown of the trade talks in 2003, I see at the end of the film some glimmers of hope that the Ethiopian coffee producers might be starting to see some of the benefits of Tadesse’s work in creating higher revenues that can be reinvested into the social development of one of the poorest nations on earth.